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App-based e-hailing ride services, which connect both drivers and riders through 
their GPS-enabled mobile devices, have rapidly developed into a viable transportation 
alternative for many travelers. This technology has changed the set of choices for travelers 
and has shifted travel patterns, most significantly away from traditional taxi services. These 
applications provide convenience and flexibility to both drivers and passengers, however, 
they have also caused several issues.  For example, they have pulled ridership off public 
transportation, damaged the taxi industry, and created new congestion etc.  during their 
expansion. In this research, we analyze   available information to arrive at a solution to 
these issues. 
As Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) become possible for E-hailing services to operate, 
especially when telecom companies start deploying next-generation wireless networks 
(known as 5G), massive, previously nonexistent transportation information will become  
available,  making  it possible for the first time in  history to run smart traffic micro-
management in  real-time. In the first part of this dissertation, a link-based surcharge which 
considers both the effects of the travelers’ route choices and travel demand patterns is 
proposed. In this approach, we assume that all links can be surcharged for those using e-
haling services, and a heuristic process is applied to address this computationally difficult 
problem. Meanwhile a cost inverse function is introduced to update the demand changes 
along paths with different rates of E-haling surcharges. In the second part of this 




dissertation, working from the assumption that all the E-hailing service vehicles are 
running by AVs, a link-based dynamic pricing model is proposed to improve road network 
system and travel time reliability at the same time. In this approach, we assume all AVs 
will be perfectly informed with updated traffic conditions and will follow dynamic road 
pricing. In the final part of the dissertation, a density-based surcharge system is proposed 
to solve the problem of the tragedy of the commons in road congestion. Under this 
surcharge system, drivers will receive penalties if they choose to take the more congested 
route and incentives if they choose a less congested route. As a result, the path choices for 
all drivers will be optimized throughout the whole transportation network. We use the 
“least-iteration-cycle” approach to lower this computational burden. By iteratively 
repeating simulations of drivers’ route choices, the system reaches an optimal real-time 
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CHAPTER 1: All Link Based E-hailing Pricing and Surcharge 




E-hailing services, in which riders request rides from their mobile devices, have 
rapidly developed into a viable transportation alternative for many travelers. This 
technology has changed the set of choices for travelers and has shifted travel patterns, most 
significantly away from traditional taxi services.  However, several issues have arisen 
during this expansion. In this paper, an economical approach is proposed which considers 
both the effects of the travelers’ route choices and travel demand patterns. In this approach, 
we assume that all links can be surcharged for those using e-haling services, and a heuristic 
process is applied to address this computationally difficult problem. A cost inverse function 
is introduced to update the demand changes along paths with different rates of E-haling 
surcharges. The method is demonstrated on the mid-size Sioux Falls, SD network and on 
the large-scale city network of Anaheim, CA. Results indicate that an optimal price could 
efficiently reduce e-hailing service demand during the congestion hours and improve the 









App-based e-hailing ride services, which connect both drivers and riders through 
their GPS-enabled mobile devices, has generated a new mode of transportation service. It 
brings a lot of convenience and flexibility to both drivers and passengers, while riders can 
enjoy high quality service with fair pricing. E-hailing service companies such as Uber, Lyft, 
and DiDi have experienced extraordinary growth in the last a few years. Currently, 10 
billion trips are accomplished by Uber (1), and Didi has recorded 30 million trips per day 
(2).  
However, this rapid expansion of E-hailing services raises several criticisms and 
challenges. Traditional taxi services have lost a significant proportion of the market share, 
as in New York City for example, where in 2017 pickup rates through ride-hailing app 
services surpassed those of taxis (3).  Meanwhile, Clewlow and Mishra (4) conclude that 
transit usage has seen a 6% reduction due to e-hailing services based on data from 4,094 
survey responses.  Though there is no clear data showing that E-hailing services increase 
city congestion, researchers criticize this congestion increase due to the way it promotes 
unnecessary trips and attracts transit commuters (5).   
To address these issues, governments have established rules and regulations to 
restrict E-hailing services. However, they tend to be either too restrictive or ineffective in 
practice. Italy and Denmark have fully banned E-hailing services, whereas cities such as 
Budapest have suspended these services (6). China was the first country that legalized E-
hailing services in July 2016, but later Beijing and Shanghai attempted to introduce local 
regulations which would restrict service drivers’ residency and vehicle registrations. If the 






these services, and customers’ average waiting time increase from 3 minutes to 15 minutes 
(7). 
In this paper, we introduce an economical way to use an optimal congestion 
surcharge mechanism as a “regulator” to address the issues created by e-hailing services. 
In a market economy, only private goods can efficiently supply a service (8). This can be 
applied to the transportation service: if the service is not “excludable”, the users would not 
be willing to pay for the service, and the “free rider problem” would appears. This would 
lead to unnecessary trips that consume road service and create road congestion, as well as 
system inefficiency and low service production.  If the service is not “rivaled”, there would 
be zero marginal costs for additional vehicles on the road, and therefore users would pay 
higher prices in order to use the road, causing the system to suffer from low “consumption”.  
We propose the general process as follows: 1) the surcharge authority sets the price 
for the road network by links per time period; 2) when riders request a ride, the system 
provides route options, calculates the total cost (including tolls), and presents the 
information to the rider; 3) riders will then choose when, how, and whether to take the e-
hailing service based on their consideration of differing prices and trip duration time; 4) 
then the surcharge authority obtains the updated traffic conditions, recalculates and sets the 
surcharge for the next iteration; 5) the iterations repeat until the convergence criteria are 
met.  In essence, the scheme prices congested routes higher than uncongested routes, which 
will lead to some riders switching to alternative uncongested routes and thus fewer riders 
selecting those congested routes. Additionally, other riders may choose to give up their e-
hailing ride or shift their ride to a less congested time period. Overall, the result would be 






process of pricing and predicting leads to a stable solution that should improve system 
performance, generate revenue for the tolling authority, and shift demand to other modes 
of travel, which are potentially more sustainable. 
The content of this paper begins with a description of the problem and previous 
relevant studies, followed by a description of the model and its components. The Sioux 
Falls network application is presented to clarify the basic concepts of the heuristic approach 
to a solution, and is then applied to the Anaheim test networks. A summary of the findings 
and discussion of the results are included in the last section of the document. 
 
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.3.1 Road pricing implementations 
Road pricing, especially targeting road congestion, doesn’t have a long-
documented history.  Singapore began implementing congestion pricing in 1975. The 
government established a restricted driving area during peak traffic hours from 7:30 am to 
9:30 am and levied extra toll charges during this peak time period. With this restriction, 
peak-hour traffic in the restricted zone dropped suddenly by 45% (9). After the traffic 
estimation and prediction tool (TrEPS) was implemented in 2010, the traffic volume in the 
restricted area was reduced by an additional 10% to 30% (10). A similar congestion-based 
pricing system was adopted in London, UK in 2003, utilizing automatic plate number 
recognition Monday through Friday from 7:00 am to 6:00 pm. The record shows the 
ridership of public transit in the city increased by 50% to 60%, and the number of 
automobiles entering into the central area of the city decreased by 21%.  London also saw 






(11). Today, Australia, Singapore, Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Malta, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, and Chile all have some 
version of a congestion road pricing scheme, and results show that peak hour travel demand 
is consistently reduced, along with other social and environmental negative externalities 
like air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, visual intrusion, noise, and road accidents (12).  
Table 1. 1 Traffic effects of different congestion charge schema 
 






































In sum, implementing the proper level of toll/surcharge on busy roads is one of 
the best viable solutions to reduce congestion. Gasoline taxes and mileage taxes might not 
be perfect solutions since they discourage drivers from shifting their routes to non-
congested roads, which does not address the congestion problems for the whole system. 
This is why road pricing is gaining popularity in many big cities around the world. 
 
1.3.2 First best road pricing mechanism 
The theoretical study of using road pricing to control congested traffic and 
generate revenue has a long history. Pigou (13) first proposed congestion pricing theory by 
using externalities to measure optimal congestion charges, which originated from the 






congested roads should pay a toll equal to the difference between the marginal social cost 
and the marginal private cost (14,15).  The marginal social cost is defined as the extra cost 
imposed on all other road users when an additional vehicle enters the system. This extra 
cost often equals the value intime loss to imposed on other road users, but it could also 
include the value associated with increased emissions, noise, and accident risks (16). More 
recently, Tan, Yang, and Guo (17) proposed a dynamic congestion pricing scheme with 
multi-class flow evolution through different values of time to minimize system cost and 
time. Rahmba and Boyles(18) later implemented the discrete time settings and logit choice 
model, where travelers’ choices depended on day-to-day adjustments to reduce the total 
system travel time. 
However, the assumption of first-best pricing, which implies road congestion is 
caused only by underpricing road users’ travel cost, is not perfect in practice. It could easily 
ignore other factors like supply and demand changes after surcharge has been applied.  If 
the “marginal-cost pricing toll” is simply applied, it may distort the allocation of traffic 
assignment over the entire traffic network. Instead of improving the system’s total travel 
time, it may sometimes cause new areas of congestion and ultimately degradation to the 
system’s social welfare (19). In this research, the “marginal-cost pricing toll” was initially 
applied as one step in the heuristic approach, while system optimal flow and travelers’ 
choice have since been included to resolve the first-best pricing issue.  
 
1.3.3 Second best road pricing mechanism 
Due to the imperfections of first-best pricing, second-best pricing, which 






Marchand (21). They focused on the simplest version of a “classic two-route problem” in 
which a non-tolled alternative road is parallel to a toll road in order to determine the toll 
levels. More recently, Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (22) studied the effectiveness of 
second-best congestion pricing cases where road users can choose between a tolled and a 
non-tolled route, and Braid (23) compared the efficiency gain between first-best and 
second-best pricing. Lindsey (24) provided an overview of second-best pricing and other 
toll strategies, and concluded that in the future, automated highways and self-driving 
vehicles would require new models for the road pricing. Sharon et al. (25) applied a link-
based novel toll mechanism to adapt the network to autonomous vehicle use in the future. 
In general, the problem with second-best road pricing is finding a set of optimal values for 
toll charges in order to minimize total travel time, maximize toll revenue, or accomplish 
both, while considering the choice behavior of network users (26). Regardless of the 
pricing mechanisms set around the different modes of transportation or around new 
innovative technology like autonomous vehicles, the second-best pricing could incorporate 
further consideration of factors in the model in order to achieve multiple goals at the same 
time.  
Most of the first-best pricing models and the second-best pricing models are 
computed assuming fixed-trip tables and fixed-network parameters due to technique 
restrictions and data limitation (25). Previous methods used to approach this problem 
usually simplify the function to a linear or exponential demand function (19), (22). Vickrey 
(27) recommend a trial-and-error based procedure to avoid using the demand function. 
Later, Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (22) extended this method to the general network 






adjustment. However, in order to achieve the convergence of the 11-link, 4 O-D pairs 
network, it required 2000 iterations to run. Recently, Zhou et al.(28) expanded this 
algorithm to take into account the system optimal flow and capacity constraints at the same 
time.  
Bi-level programs, in which upper-level problems dictate the optimal tolls and 
lower-level problems subject to route choice constraint, are commonly used in the second-
best pricing model. Such programs, applied to both static and dynamic flow models are 
known as NP hard problems, even when both upper-level and lower-level problems are 
convex (25). In this research, a tri-phase program is proposed, representing the surcharge 
authority, e-hailing service companies, and customers respectively.  
 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
As noted previously, there is a large amount of literature regarding the 
implementation of different versions of road pricing. In this research, tri-level optimal road 
pricing for e-hailing services is proposed. Similar to the work done by Sharon et al. (25), 
we assume that all links can be tolled since the e-hailing services are app-based and GPS 
tracking is available at all times. However, our heuristic approach does not include the 
“oscillation effect” and can mathematically prove the system optimal (SO) solution when 
the convergence criteria are met. In addition, we consider the demand changes after the 
surcharge, a significant difference from the work done by previous researchers (19, 23, 28).  
1.4 MODEL 
The objective of this model is to optimize transportation system performance 






existing demand by considering riders’ trip decisions and route choices. Therefore, three 
components are included in this model: the surcharge authority, which aims to improve the 
transportation system performance by setting the optimal link surcharge rates for the entire 
network; the e-hailing companies, which will obey the surcharge mechanism while 
targeting serving as much of their original service demand before the surcharge as possible; 
and the riders, who make the travel decisions and route choices, and always seek the route 
with the minimum cost while making a “to go or not to go” decision based on the cost.  A 
directed graph is presented,   𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐴), where 𝑁 is the set of nodes and 𝐴 is the set of 
links, which represent the transportation system using the corresponding notation described 







Table 1. 2 Notation Index 
________________________________________________________________________ 
a ∈ A           Link 𝑎 belonging to set of links 𝐴. 
i ∈ N           Node 𝑖 belonging to set of nodes 𝑁. 
𝑤 ∈ 𝑊        O-D pair 𝑤 belonging to set of O-D pairs 𝑊 
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾        Path in set of paths K 
𝜇                 Total travel cost 
𝜇𝑤
0        Initial general travel cost for O-D pair 𝑤 before the surcharge 
𝜇𝑤
𝑛        General travel cost for O-D pair 𝑤 at iteration n 
𝑑𝑤              Traffic Demand of O-D pair 𝑤 
𝐷𝑤              Travel Demand function for O-D pair 𝑤 
𝑓𝑘
𝑤              Flow on path k connecting O-D pair 𝑤 
𝛿𝑎
𝑤,𝑘
            Equal to 1 if link a on the path k between the O-D pair w, otherwise equal to 0 
𝑥𝑎               Traffic volume of link a 
𝐶𝑎               Capacity of link a 
𝑡𝑎(𝑥)          Time cost function for link a with volume x  
𝑀𝑎              Marginal cost for link a                    
𝑆𝑎
𝑛       Link surcharge rate in iteration n 
 
 
A tri-phase programming model is proposed to solve this optimal link surcharge 
rate problem. The first two phases represent the surcharge authority and e-hailing service 
companies separately; their back-and-forth negotiation will directly determine the final 
surcharge rate. However, both the surcharge authority and the e-hailing service companies 
will make decisions based on the riders’ reactions, which is addressed in the lower level 
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= 𝑑𝑤    ∀ 𝑘, 𝑤 (6) 
 
 𝑓𝑘
𝑤,𝑛 ≥ 0       ∀ 𝑘, 𝑤 (7) 
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standard system optimization formula, following the work of Sheffi (29). Objective 
function (2), which addresses the e-hailing service companies’ objectives, is the OD trip-
based formulation.  It assumes that the E-hailing service companies obey the surcharge 
mechanism and aim to meet their original service demands as much as possible. The 
general travel cost function is exhibited in equation (3), demonstrating the relationship 
between each OD trip travel cost associated with each correlated links’ travel time and 
surcharge. Equation (4) is the cost constraint for the OD trip after the surcharge is applied. 
At the trip level, equations (3) and (4) determine each OD trip service demand for each 
iteration. At the link-based level, equations (5) ~ (7) calculate the estimated traffic based 
on the new surcharges and service demands; equations (8) ~ (10) are the definitional 
constraints for the path-link transformation relation and link surcharge calculation 
mechanisms based on the marginal externality.  
The model presented here targets traffic system performance improvement 
through the surcharge mechanism while integrating the service demand changes. Sheffi 
(29) demonstrated that the marginal externality is the difference between the UE and SO.  
This work leverages fundamental traffic assignment in a heuristic approach that allows the 
method to be scaled up significantly.  
 
1.5 SOLUTION APPROACH 
A heuristic solution approach is applied to solve the E-hailing problem. Three major 
phases are involved in this process. In the first phase, the solution aims to maximize system 
performance by minimizing the total system travel time, while the second phase attempts 






assumption that the information is perfect, riders obtain all the information and make their 
route choices. The aggregation of each riders’ travel decisions characterizes the traffic 
condition of the specific time period that follows, then the surcharge authority accurately 
obtains this information. The surcharge rate is then recalibrated and updated. This loop 
continues until the difference in surcharge rates between iterations in the objective function 
fall below a critical threshold.  The essential steps in this process are shown below: 
Step 1: Initialize the network. 
 Step 2: Calculate the link marginal cost. 
 Step 3: Update the link surcharge rate with MSA. 
 Step 4: Estimate the travel demand based on the updated link surcharge rate. 
 Step 5: Re-predict the traffic condition based on the new demand and surcharge 
rate. 
Step 6: If the links surcharge difference is less than the convergence criteria, stop. 
Otherwise, go to Step 2 and repeat. 
 
1.5.1 Initialize the network 
The preliminary step of initializing the network is to set the network to the no-surcharge 
scenario by carrying the full load of demand and distributing traffic with the UE assignment. 








 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒           𝛿𝑎
𝑘,𝑤 = {
1, 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑎 𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑘








   
As shown in equation (1), the original OD trip travel cost μ𝑤
0  is calculated by the 
total cost of its shortest path, and   𝛿𝑎
𝑘,𝑤 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if link 𝑎 is on the 
path 𝑘 between the O-D pair 𝑤. 
 
1.5.2 Calculate the link marginal cost  
The link marginal cost function implies that when one vehicle is added to a road, it 
aggregates costs, which result from two aspects. One of the aspects is the car itself that 
incurs a cost, which is presented as 𝑡𝑎(𝑥𝑎
𝑛); the other is the negative externality of adding 
an additional car, which imposes costs on all the other existing cars on the road. The value 
of this negative externality is equal to the arc elasticity of the link cost (subject to current 










𝑛  (12) 
 
 
1.5.3 Update the surcharge rate with MSA 
The assumption that perfect information is obtained allows the surcharge authority to 
update the expected surcharge rate of the network based on its knowledge of the travelers’ 
previous travel decisions. The s-expected surcharge is updated with equation (13), where 
𝑀𝑎
𝑛 is the current marginal cost of link a, and 𝑆𝑎
































1.5.4 Update travel demand based on surcharge 
In this step, with the least costly path already having been identified for each O-D pair, the 
inverse travel cost function is applied to estimate the new demand. In the economic inverse 
demand function, “the price of a good represents the marginal willingness to pay for an 
extra unit of the good by anyone who is demanding that good” (30). The inverse travel cost 
function at any given trip’s cost, this function will measure how many riders would be 
willing to take the trip that they have initially been offered. The inverse cost function of 
travel demand, which is equal to the travelers’ willingness to pay for their desired trip, 





𝑛 ) (14) 
 
With the cost of μ𝑤
𝑛   , traveling on path w ∈ 𝑊 , the demand function is d𝑤
𝑛 =
Dw(μ𝑤
𝑛 ) .  t𝑤
𝑛  and 𝑆𝑤
𝑛  represent the total travel time cost and the total surcharge cost in 




𝑛  (15) 
 
In this heuristic approach, this equation try to serve as much of the original travel 
demand as possible, which is the solution to equation (2) subject to (4), however, the 
mathematic solution to this problem is not easy since each link in the network could be 






solve this maximum problem: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Begin  
  Set  ∀𝑥𝑎
∗ = 0, incremental iteration  𝑖 = 1, incremental rate 𝑝; 
 While 




  Do {  
Perform all-pair-shortest path assignment for all demand 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 based on 
𝜇𝑎
𝑛 
Set each links on the shortest path 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊:   𝛿𝑎
𝑤,𝑛 = 1, Otherwise: 𝛿𝑎
𝑤,𝑛 = 0 
While  
 
  OD pair 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and 
 ∑𝛿𝑎












Update link volume: 𝑥𝑎
∗  +=  𝛿𝑎
𝑤 ∙ 𝐷𝑤
0 ∙ 𝑝;  
     Update OD pair demand: 𝐷𝑤
𝑛  +=  𝐷𝑤
0 ∙ 𝑝; 
     Move to next OD pair 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊; 
} 
   𝑖 + +; 
   } 
End;  
 
1.5.5 Convergence criteria 
The heuristic approach ends when the convergence criteria meet, which is when the sum 














At the end of this heuristic approach, we will have following result: 
 
Proposition 1. If the link performance functions are in monotonic form and the 
convergence criterion are met at the last iteration, the traffic assignment under the 
surcharge schema is the network system optimal solution.  
 






















𝑛−1| ≤              ( :→ 0) (18) 
 
This means the solution would have 𝑆𝑎
𝑛 ≅ 𝑆𝑎
𝑛−1  for each of the links at the last two 













































Which is equal to the first order condition of the system optimal solution objective 
function: 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ?̃?(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑎(𝑥𝑎) (32): 
 




















Therefore, at the end of the heuristic approach, when the convergence criterion is met, the 
UE traffic assignment is the network system optimal solution as expected given the 
previous work on the topic (28). 
 
1.6 RESULTS 
The method described will first be demonstrated in the well-known and well-
studied 24 nodes, 76 links, and 360,600 total OD trips comprising the Sioux Fall network 
(assuming that all demands are being made for the e-hailing services). The different lines 
(solid/dot/dash) indicate the link volume-to-capacity (v/c) ratio based on User Equilibrium 
Assignment (as shown in Figure 1.1), which is within0.14% of the best-known link flows 
solution (31). Due to the large travel demand, 37 out of76 links are over capacity, and eight 
links have a v/c ratio over 1.5. Many of the high-volume links are clustered around the 

























FIGURE 1. 1 Sioux Falls Network Volume-to-Capacity Ratios under UE Assignment 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the link surcharge rates and v/c ratios after the e-hailing 
surcharge is applied. With a 31.93% decrease in demand, most links’ congestion 
conditions would be reduced, and only seven links would be over capacity. Although link 
11 to 12 and link 22 to 23 bothhave a v/c ratio over 1.5, their alternative routes are all 
congested.  An important note here is that links between 13 and 24, and 10 and 16, have 
been charged the highest rate even if they are not seriously congested in the scenario 
without surcharge. The reason for this is that even with the surcharge, the demands for 
using nearby alternative links are still high, and the high surcharge rate prevents a large 




































































































































































































FIGURE 1. 2 Surcharge Rate with Volume-to-Capacity Ratio 
 
 
Table 1.3 displays the percentage of original O-D trips that have been served 
after the e-hailing surcharge. Several observations should be noted: first, the percentage 
of demand served for the original O-D trips remains mostly in the range of 65%~75%; 






of the O-D trips have been served 95% of the time and above (e.g. the trip from 2 to 12, 
12 to3, 16 to 18 etc.); third, the highest surcharge rate didn’t dramatically decrease 
service demand. For example, the link 6 to 8 surcharge is 10.37 units of time. However, 
total demand only decreased 30%, due a lack of alternative routes and the high-volume 
present on those routes.  




Table 1.4 exhibits different alternative routes in three traffic conditions. In the 
most congested route, traffic conditions improved after the surcharge was applied. 
However, due to the longer distance in the alternative routes, the travelers should still 
expect a much longer travel time even with a high surcharge rate. Similarly, in the median 
congested route category, since these routes are also located in the center of the city, 
travelers choose the alternative routes still face a considerably expensive surcharge and 
O/D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 N/A 100% 75% 68% 70% 89% 71% 71% 68% 67% 74% 93% 83% 65% 68% 68% 67% 71% 69% 71% 65% 65% 69% 68%
2 100% N/A 77% 68% 60% 89% 71% 71% 65% 66% 74% 95% 84% 65% 67% 68% 70% N/A 69% 71% N/A 71% N/A N/A
3 71% 73% N/A 68% 70% 61% 69% 68% 68% 67% 74% 100% 89% 65% 68% 67% 67% N/A N/A N/A N/A 65% 69% N/A
4 70% 70% 70% N/A 84% 57% 69% 68% 68% 67% 74% 70% 71% 65% 68% 67% 67% 69% 69% 69% 65% 68% 67% 68%
5 73% 61% 73% 88% N/A 56% 69% 68% 68% 67% 74% 73% 73% 65% 68% 67% 67% N/A 69% 69% 67% 68% 67% N/A
6 89% 89% 56% 54% 53% N/A 71% 70% 64% 64% 59% 56% 56% 62% 66% 68% 69% 71% 68% 71% 71% 70% 64% 66%
7 69% 69% 66% 66% 66% 68% N/A 76% 77% 61% 64% 66% 65% 68% 65% 73% 73% 65% 64% 71% 73% 68% 67% 63%
8 67% 67% 65% 65% 64% 67% 74% N/A 77% 73% 72% 65% 65% 68% 67% 64% 69% 74% 66% 74% 74% 71% 68% 65%
9 74% 66% 74% 74% 74% 66% 69% 68% N/A 66% 66% 74% 74% 68% 68% 66% 67% 69% 69% 69% 67% 68% 67% 70%
10 70% 66% 70% 70% 70% 66% 62% 67% 66% N/A 67% 66% 66% 68% 70% 62% 67% 62% 70% 66% 67% 68% 68% 65%
11 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 61% 66% 68% 68% 70% N/A 63% 63% 64% 70% 66% 68% 66% 70% 67% 64% 68% 65% 67%
12 86% 89% 100% 69% 70% 61% 69% 68% 68% 67% 64% N/A 75% 64% 68% 67% 67% 69% 69% 66% 65% 65% 69% 68%
13 81% 81% 89% 69% 71% 61% 66% 68% 69% 67% 64% 76% N/A 69% 65% 66% 67% 66% 65% 66% 65% 65% 69% 68%
14 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 67% 65% 66% 67% 67% 69% 67% 70% N/A 67% 67% 64% 65% 67% 65% 65% 65% 68% 79%
15 69% 67% 69% 69% 69% 67% 62% 65% 67% 68% 67% 67% 65% 73% N/A 68% 60% 62% 89% 62% 65% 66% 66% 63%
16 66% 66% 65% 65% 65% 66% 75% 65% 70% 61% 64% 65% 65% 68% 65% N/A 73% 100% 65% 79% 74% 68% 67% 64%
17 69% 69% 69% 69% 69% 69% 75% 70% 67% 67% 67% 66% 66% 65% 58% 75% N/A 75% 56% 74% 73% 62% 64% 67%
18 69% N/A N/A 66% N/A 68% 64% 76% 77% 61% 64% 66% 65% 68% 65% 100% 73% N/A 64% 73% 74% 68% 67% N/A
19 69% 66% N/A 69% 69% 66% 61% 64% 68% 69% 68% 67% 65% 77% 94% 67% 59% 61% N/A 61% 65% 66% 67% 63%
20 69% 69% N/A 66% 66% 68% 70% 76% 76% 66% 67% 65% 65% 67% 65% 74% 73% 72% 64% N/A 74% 68% 67% 63%
21 65% N/A N/A 65% 67% 71% 75% 75% 66% 66% 67% 65% 65% 65% 64% 75% 73% 75% 64% 75% N/A 60% 63% 61%
22 65% 69% 65% 68% 68% 68% 68% 73% 67% 67% 67% 65% 65% 67% 64% 68% 62% 68% 66% 68% 61% N/A 66% 61%
23 70% N/A 70% 69% 69% 67% 65% 68% 66% 66% 69% 70% 70% 69% 65% 65% 63% 65% 65% 65% 64% 64% N/A 100%






extra travel time. This is the opposite case in the non-congested category, where travelers 
should expect ahigher surcharge rate and longer travel time because their alternative route 
will go through some congested links. 
Table 1. 4 Sample of Paths Choice by Category 
 











 From 12 to 10 
  Links Time Surcharge 
Path 1 12-11-10 13.21 12.17 
Path 2 12-3-4-11-10 20.99 7.18 












 From 10 to 18 
  Links Time Surcharge 
Path 1 10-16-18 7.83 13.05 
Path 2 10-17-16-18 16.58 12.77 










From 5 to 3 
  Links Time Surcharge 
Path 1 5-4-3 6.19 0.51 
Path 2 5-6-2-1-3 19.3 6.11 
Path 3 5-9-10-11-12-3 28.22 18.18 
 
Overall, as table 1.5 shows, with a 31.93% demand change, the total system travel 
time saves 35.79% and each link travel time saves 4.55%. The road becomes less congested 


















Total system travel 
time 7,476,971 4,800,960 -35.79% 
Travel Demand 360,600 245,450 -31.93% 
Average link travel 
time 8.81 8.41 -4.55% 
Average link V/C 
ratio 1.09 0.73 -32.86% 
Average Surcharge 
rate 0.00 3.09 N/A 
Average link travel 
cost 8.81 11.25 27.74% 
 
 
To demonstrate scalability, the algorithm was executed on the Anaheim, California 
case study. The Anaheim network contains 416 nodes, 1406  Origin-Destination pairs, and 
914 links. Since the number of nodes is larger, Figure 1.3 shows only the major features of 









FIGURE 1. 3 The Anaheim Network 
 
As table 1.6 shows, traffic conditions in Anaheim are not as congested as those in 
the Sioux Falls network, and it only has 64 of 914 links over capacity. Therefore, the 
average link surcharge rate is 0.02 units of time, and the average link travel time is 0.91 
minutes. However, due to low initial travel costs, after surcharge rate are implemented the 
total travel demand is expected to decrease by 31.92%. The most affected links are the 
congested ones, with a maximum surcharge of 1.70 units of time. After implementation, 
the number of congested links drops by 85.94% to nine links, and that reduces the total 
















Total system travel time 1,837,106 1,215,992 -33.81% 
Travel Demand 104,794 70,296 -32.92% 
Average link travel time 0.91 0.89 -1.98% 
Number of congested 
links 64 9 -85.94% 
Average Surcharge rate 0.00 0.02 N/A 
Average link travel cost 0.90 0.91 0.08% 
 











 From 120 to 399 
  Links Time Surcharge 
Path 
















From 206 to 204 

















 From 337 to 308 
  Links Time Surcharge 
Path 
1 337-44-308 4.00 0 
Path 
2 337-29-308 6.19 0 
 
Table 1.7 exhibits more specific samples of three traffic conditions in the Anaheim 
network. As in the Sioux Falls network, travelers on the most congested routes and median 






However, because the alternative routes will not go through the congested links, in the non- 
congested category travelers on these alternative routes should not expect a higher 
surcharge rate. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
In this research, we introduced an economical way to calculate the E-hailing 
optimal surcharge rate to reduce the service demand during peak travel hours and estimate 
the resulting traffic conditions. All links-based E-hailing service congestion surcharges are 
calculated through a heuristic approach. The results demonstrate that the principles of UE 
assignment are maintained in the travelers’ path choice behavior while leveraging the 
relationship between SO and UE using the marginal cost function.  At the same time, 
revenue received from this surcharge can be used in various ways, such as improving transit 
service quality or upgrading road infrastructure which can advance road network 
performance. In all applications in this paper, demand saw a significant drop from its 
original level.  Future work can explore alternate means of estimating demand response to 
surcharge levels and/or tuning the existing function. 
There are numerous challenges in the future for this, or any, methods that verify 
and validate the calculation of E-hailing surcharge rates and travel demand updating. 
Application on large networks presents substantial challenges, especially if on-demand 
applications (in real-time situations, for example) are to be pursued, since one link’s 
volume change will affect more links due to the complexity of network. The demand 
function is also relatively simple and can be improved, as can the differential metric; the 
customer’s alternative travel modes and possible shift schedules could also be discussed. 






prediction should provide the type of reliability and realism that such an important topic 
deserves. 
The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception 
and design: Qixing Wang, Nicholas E. Lownes; data collection: Qixing Wang; analysis 
and interpretation of results: Qixing Wang, Nicholas E. Lownes; draft manuscript 
preparation: Qixing Wang, Nicholas E. Lownes. All authors reviewed the results and 
approved the final version of the manuscript. 
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CHAPTER 2: Dynamic Pricing for Autonomous Vehicle E-hailing 
Services Reliability and Performance Improvement  
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
As Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) become possible for E-hailing services operate, 
especially when telecom companies start deploying next-generation wireless networks 
(known as 5G) , many new technologies may be applied in these vehicles. Dynamic-route-
switching is one of these technologies, which could help vehicles find the best possible 
route based on real-time traffic information. However, allowing all AVs to choose their 
own optimal routes is not the best solution for a complex city network, since each vehicle 
ignores its negative effect on the road system due to the additional congestion it creates. 
As a result, with this system, some of the links may become over-congested, causing the 
whole road network system performance to degrade. Meanwhile, the travel time reliability, 
especially during the peak hours, is an essential factor to improve the customers’ ride 
experience. Unfortunately, these two issues have received relatively less attention. In this 
paper, we design a link-based dynamic pricing model to improve the road network system 
and travel time reliability at the same time. In this approach, we assume that all links are 
eligible with the dynamic pricing, and AVs will be perfect informed with update traffic 
condition and follow the dynamic road pricing.  A heuristic approach is developed to 
address this computationally difficult problem. The output includes link-based surcharge, 
new travel demand and traffic condition which would improve the system performance 






we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed model to the well-known test 
Sioux Falls network.  
 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, autonomous vehicles (AVs) equipped with advanced sensor 
technologies and able to drive themselves without any human intervention have been 
developed [1]. They can provide many advantages when compared with human’s driving. 
For example, Avs have the potential to reduce crashes, smoothing traffic, and reducing 
the congestion time [2].  However, due to the new features associated with of AVs, more 
advanced research is needed to learn about their travel behavior and system performance, 
especially regarding to city congestion issues. 
Road pricing, especially the congestion pricing, is not new in the transportation 
industry. Singapore began implementing congestion pricing in 1975, which set up a 
restricted driving area and levied extra toll charges during the peak traffic hours [3]. 
Today, countries like the UK, Australia, Sweden, and Finland are all have some version 
of a congestion road pricing scheme. Results indicate that implementing the proper level 
of toll/surcharge is one of the best viable solutions to reduce congestion, along with other 
social and environmental negative externalities like air pollution, greenhouse gas 
emissions, visual intrusion, noise, and road accidents [4].  
In this paper, we will apply the theoretical study of using road pricing to control 
congested traffic and improve the network system performance. Pigou [5] first proposed 
congestion pricing theory by using externalities to measure optimal congestion charges, 
which originated from the concept of the economics of welfare. In line with this theory, 






marginal social cost and the marginal private cost [6,7].  However, the assumption of 
first-best pricing, which implies road congestion is caused only by underpricing road 
users’ travel cost, is not perfect in practice. It sometimes overlooks other factors like 
supply and demand changes after surcharges have been applied.  If they are simply 
applied without considering the consequences of their application, it may distort the 
allocation of traffic assignment over the entire traffic network [8]. 
    Due to the imperfections of first-best pricing, second-best pricing, which incorporates 
feedback from the system, was first explored by Lévy-Lambert [9] and Marchand [10]. They 
focused on the simplest version of a “classic two-route problem” in which a non-tolled 
alternative road runs parallel to a toll road in order to determine toll levels. More recently, 
Wang and Lownes [11] applied a link-based surcharge mechanism to adapt a full network 
to E-hailing service use. In general, the problem with second-best road pricing is finding a 
set of optimal values for toll charges in order to minimize total travel time, maximize toll 
revenue, or accomplish both, while also considering the choice behavior of network users. 
Regardless of the pricing mechanisms set around different modes of transportation or 
around new innovative technology like autonomous vehicles, the second-best pricing model 
can incorporate further consideration of factors in the model in order to achieve multiple 
goals at the same time.  
  In this paper, we design a link-based dynamic pricing model to improve the road 
network system and travel time reliability simultaneously. Different than the previous 
dynamic pricing studies focus on toll pricing and traffic assignment e.g., Nikolic et al.[15], 
Lu and Mahmassani [16] and Sharron et al. [17],  this study more focus on the AVs 






As the result, the prices on congested routes are higher than uncongested routes, which lead 
to AVs to switching to alternative uncongested routes and thus results in fewer AVs 
selecting those congested routes. Additionally, with service reliability control, the 
increasing of the dynamic pricing would lead some customers shift their ride to a less 
congested time period or shift their e-hailing ride to more economic mode e.g. transit, 
bicycle, etc. Overall, the iterative process of pricing and predicting impact leads to a stable 
solution that should improve system performance, maintain the traffic level, and ensure the 
customers’ travel reliability at the same time. The contributions of this work are: 
• An efficient algorithm that will update the travel demand while ensuring each link will maintain 
a non-congestion condition. Previous work either focused on one travel demand estimation 
only or limited the travel reliability in a regional network [18]. 
• A bi-level mathematic model with consideration of customers choose to give up their e-hailing 
ride or shift their ride to a less congested time period. 
• A platform output that would not only include optimal pricing, but also the surcharge revenue, 
the new travel demand under this pricing and the associated traffic condition. 
 
2.3 NETWORK MODELS 
As illustrated in Fig. 2.1. there are four main components in this model: the 
Surcharge Authority, the E-hailing service company, the E-hailing customers, and the 
Autonomous Service vehicles (AVs). With the customers’ trip requests, E-hailing service 
companies calculate the riders’ estimated trip time and pricing based on current 
autonomous vehicle locations, status, and surcharge authority based dynamic pricing. If 
the riders accept the trips’ rates and times, the E-hailing company will assign the AVs to 






updated and send to the surcharge authority at each time segment, and the surcharge 
authority will use this information to calculate dynamic pricing for next time interval.  
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In this paper, we propose a link based dynamic pricing system for Autonomous 
Vehicle (AV) Ride-sharing E-hailing Services. The goals include optimizing traffic system 
performance while maintaining each rider’s travel time reliability. By introducing link 
based dynamic pricing: a) road network usage will change from depending on each 
vehicle’s shortest path to employing the path which will minimize total system travel time; 
b) trip travel time will be guaranteed in a certain range through the demand changes 
instigated by pricing. Previous work either assumes that the demand is fixed or only targets 
optimal road network traffic conditions [19]. The generalization of the dynamic pricing 
problem formulation is explained in the following subsection, and a list of parameters and 








Table 2. 1 Notation Index 
 
A bi-level programming model is proposed to solve this dynamic pricing problem. 
The outer layer of this model represents the surcharge authority, which calculates the 
most effective pricing to achieve System Optimal (SO) traffic conditions and guarantee 
the trip travel time in an acceptable range. The objective functions and subjective 











≤ 𝑑𝑤,0    ∀ 𝑘, 𝑤 (3) 
 
 𝑓𝑘
𝑤,𝑛 ≥ 0       ∀ 𝑘, 𝑤 (4) 
 
a ∈ A Link 𝑎 belonging to set of links 𝐴. 𝑑𝑤 Traffic Demand of O-D pair 𝑤 
i ∈ N Node 𝑖 belonging to set of nodes 𝑁. 𝐷𝑤 Travel Demand function for O-D pair 𝑤 
𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 O-D pair 𝑤 belonging to set of O-D pairs 𝑊 𝑓𝑘
𝑤 Flow on path k connecting O-D pair 𝑤 
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 Path in set of paths K 𝑥𝑎 Traffic volume of link a 
𝛼 Travel time variation allowance rate  𝑡𝑎(𝑥) Travel time function for link a with volume x 
𝛽 Travel cost variation allowance rate 𝑀𝑎 Marginal cost for link a 
𝜇 Total travel cost 𝑆𝑎
𝑛 Link surcharge rate in iteration n 
𝜇𝑤





Equal to 1 if link a on the path k between the 





































𝑛−1    (7) 
 
Objective function (1), which represents the surcharge authority objective, is the 
standard system optimization formula. Equation (2) is the link travel time constraint, which 
ensures each link travel time does not exceed the given threshold.  Equations (3) and (4) 
are the constraints which define all path volumes that fall between 0 and the original total 
demand. Equation (1) and constraints (3) and (4) are similar to the User Equilibrium 
assignment [12]. Equation (5) is the definitional constraint from path to link formulation 
transformation. Equations (6) and (7) are link pricing calculation mechanisms based on the 
marginal externality. 
The inner layer, which includes the AVs, E-hailing service companies, and the AVs’ 




















𝑛    ∀ 𝑎, 𝑤 (9) 
 
 μ𝑤
𝑛 ≤ (1 + 𝛽) μ𝑤
0    ∀ 𝑤 (10) 
   
 
 𝑑𝑤
𝑛 ≤ 𝑑𝑤,0   ∀ 𝑤 (11) 
 














𝑛     ∀ 𝑘, 𝑤 (13) 
 
 𝑓𝑘
𝑤,𝑛 ≥ 0       ∀ 𝑘, 𝑤 (14) 
The object function (8) is defined as the maximum number of trips based on original 
demand. The general travel cost function is exhibited in equation (9), demonstrating the 
relationship between each OD trip travel cost associated with the correlated link’s travel 
time and link pricing. Equations (10) and (11) are the cost constraints for the OD trip after 






demand for each iteration. At the link-based level, Equations (12) ~ (14) assume each 
vehicle has chosen its least costly route, which means these equations can estimate traffic 
condition based on the new link pricing and service demands through this process. 
 
2.4 SOLUTION ALGORITHM  
A heuristic solution algorithm is developed to solve this E-hailing autonomous 
vehicle pricing and travel time reliability problems. Four major phases are involved in the 
process to improve system performance: in the first phase, the algorithm aims to minimize 
total system travel time, while the second phase aims to serve as much original demand as 
possible.   In the third phase, the AVs obtain all previously-calculated information with the 
assumption that it is perfect and use it to make their route choices. In the last phase, each 
link travel time will be ensured in a certain range. If the volume increases over capacity, 
the incremental process will end.  The aggregation of each rider’s travel decisions 
characterizes the traffic conditions of each specific time period that follows, and the 
surcharge authority accurately obtains this information.  The link pricing rate is then 
recalibrated and updated. This loop continues until the difference between iterations of link 
pricing rates in the objective function falls below a critical threshold.  The essential steps 








Algorithm 1 Algorithm for optimal pricing and traffic estimation  
Input: road network and original travel demand 
Output: optimal price, demand, and traffic conditions under the pricing. 
1. Initiate the network by assigning the traffic based on original demand and each trip travel 
cost 𝜇𝑤
0 . 
1. Based on the link volume 𝑥𝑎 from previous step, calculate the marginal price 𝑀𝑎
𝑛 and 
associate MSA surcharge rate 𝑆𝑎
𝑛. 
3.  Estimate each OD pair 𝑤 travel demand 𝑑𝑤 based on the updated link surcharge rate 
while ensuring the link travel time 𝑡𝑎(𝑥). 
4. Re-estimate the traffic assignment with the update demand and surcharge rate. 
5. Convergence check:  if the link Surcharge rate difference is smaller than the criteria 
∑ |𝑆𝑎
𝑛 − 𝑆𝑎
𝑛−1|𝑎 <  , otherwise return to step 1. 
 
     
A. Initialize the network  
In the initial stage, the time period is divided into 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 time segments to coordinate 
traffic information update frequency. Within the initial time segment 𝑡0, the network is set 
to the no-surcharge scenario by carrying the full load of demand and distributing traffic 
with the UE assignment. The original O-D trip travel cost is calculated using the total link 















1, 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑜𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ
0,                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒            
 
(15) 
   
As shown,  𝛿𝑎
𝑘,𝑤 is an indicator variable for each link: it is equal to 1 if link 𝑎 is on 
the shortest path 𝑘 between the O-D pair 𝑤; it is equal to 0 if link 𝑎 is not on that path. 
Through this step, the complex network path-based cost problem is transferred to the link-
based calculation. 
 
B. Calculate the link dynamic pricing 
The E-hailing AVs’ dynamic pricing is calculated using each time segment to 
coordinate the traffic information update. The two process are: using marginal pricing 
computing to optimize the network balance; and using an iterative heuristic approach to 
capture the travelers’ reactions.  
Link-based marginal cost computing implies the negative externality of adding an 
additional car, which imposes costs on all the other existing cars on the road. The value of 
this negative externality is equal to the arc elasticity of the link cost (subject to current 










𝑛  (17) 
The Appendix shows the difference between the non-surcharge scenario and the 
System Optimal (SO) scenario is the link-based marginal cost.  Which indicate that, if all 






negative externality on all other existing vehicles, the final traffic condition is the System 
Optimal (SO) solution.          
Meanwhile, the assumption of perfect information allows the AVs to receive the 
dynamic link pricing for the network during each time interval as the surcharge authorities 
obtain the traffic conditions at the same time.  In order to reduce this back-and-forth process, 
the Measure of Success Average method (MSA) is introduced here. The link iteration 
pricing is updated with equation (18), where 𝑀𝑎
𝑛 is the current marginal cost of link a, and 
𝑆𝑎

























C. Update travel demand  
     In this step, with the least costly path already having been identified for each O-D 
pair, the inverse travel cost function is applied to estimate the new demand [11]. In the 
economic inverse demand function “the price of a good represents the marginal willingness 
to pay for an extra unit of the good by anyone who is demanding that good” [13]. The 
inverse travel cost function at any given trip’s cost measures how many AVs would be 
willing to take the ride which they intended in the non-surcharge scenario. The inverse cost 
function of travel demand, which is equal to the travelers’ willingness to pay for their 











     With the cost of μ𝑤




𝑛 ).  t𝑤
𝑛  and 𝑆𝑤
𝑛  represent the route total travel time cost and the total surcharge rate 




𝑛  (20) 
   
In this heuristic approach, in order to coordinate the travel time reliably, which 
constrains equation (2), and serves as much of the original travel demand as possible, which 
is the solution to equation (8) ~ (14). However, the mathematic solution to this problem is 
not straightforward since each link in the network can be used by multiple routes. This 
means if one AV switches its route, it could affect multiple AVs, causing them to switch 
their routes or even cancel their trips. And this problem becomes more complicated 
considering reliable the travel time simultaneously. Therefore, we propose the following 








Algorithm 2 Algorithm for travel demand estimation while ensuring travel time reliability 
Begin  
1:   Set  ∀𝑥𝑎
∗ = 0, incremental iteration  𝑖 = 1, incremental rate 𝑝; 
 While 




   Do {  
3:    Perform all-pair-shortest path assignment for all demand 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 
based on 𝜇𝑎
𝑛 
4:    Set each link on the shortest path 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊:   𝛿𝑎
𝑤,𝑛 = 1, Otherwise: 𝛿𝑎
𝑤,𝑛 = 0 
While  
5:       OD pair 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and 
 ∑𝛿𝑎












6:       Update link volume: 𝑥𝑎
∗  +=  𝛿𝑎
𝑤 ∙ 𝐷𝑤
0 ∙ 𝑝;   
7:       Update OD pair demand: 𝐷𝑤
𝑛  +=  𝐷𝑤
0 ∙ 𝑝 
8:       Move to next OD pair 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊; 
     }         
     Check each link: 
9:       If: 𝑡𝑎
𝑛(𝜔) ≥ (1 + 𝛼)𝑡𝑎,0 
10:       Increase the surcharge rate by: 
         𝑆𝑎
𝑛 = 𝑆𝑎
𝑛 ∙ (1 + 𝛽%) 
} 
  𝑖 + +; 
   } 
End;  
     
     The pseudo-code of algorithm 2 demonstrates the incremental process of the new 
travel demand estimation while ensuring travel time reliability. Lines 1 and 2 are the outer 
layer loop and searching step length settings for this algorithm. Lines 3 and 4 identify the 
all-pair-shortest-path based on current traffic conditions and price. Similar to [14], 
performing all-pair-shortest-path process in the beginning of the incremental loading loop 
will reduce the computation complexity. Since this program will run multiple iterations, 
the difference between conducting it in the beginning and during incremental loading will 






original demand will add to the network based on the travel cost; while lines 9 and 10 are 
the second criteria to check in order to see if 𝑝 percent demand added to the network will 
cause link congestion. The program will move to the next iteration after these two criterial 
checks. 
 
D. Convergence Check  
The heuristic approach ends when the convergence criteria meet, which is when the 






 <   (21) 
     Overall, this heuristic approach simulates the back-and-forth negotiation process 
among the surcharge authority, the E-hailing company, the AVs and the customers. Since 
this process is based on each component’s reaction, it will not encounter feasible solution 
issues. That means at the worst-case scenarios, the dynamic pricing of the link surcharge 
will become extremely high, which will exclude some customers to ensure that the link 
maintains its non-congested condition. Leftover customers may shift their ride to a less 
congested time period or switch to another mode of transportation (like public transit).  
 
2.5 EVALUATION RESULT 
    The method described above will be demonstrated in the well-known and well-
studied 24 nodes, 76 links, and 360,600 total OD trips comprising the Sioux Fall network 






this network bears little physical sameness to Sioux Falls, South Dakota today, the network 
and its associated data have been widely used in variety of transportation network analysis 
studies.[20] The different lines (solid/dot/dash) indicate the link volume-to-capacity (v/c) 
ratio based on User Equilibrium Assignment (as shown in Fig. 2.2). Due to the large travel 
demand, 37 out of 76 links are over capacity, and eight links have a v/c ratio over 1.5. Many 
of the high-volume links are clustered around the network center at nodes 11 and 6, as they 
are where the travel is concentrated. 
Fig. 2.3 illustrates the link surcharge rates and v/c ratios after the e-hailing 
surcharge has been applied. With a 44.75% decrease in demand, most of the links’ 
congestion conditions have been reduced. An important note here is that links between 13 
and 24, and 10 and 16, have been charged the highest rate even though they are not 
seriously congested in the non-surcharge scenario. The reason for this is that even with the 
surcharge, the demands for using nearby alternative links are still high, and a high 
surcharge rate prevents a large amount of traffic from switching to these non-congested 
roads. 
Table 2.2 exhibits different alternative routes in three traffic conditions. In the most 
congested route, the traffic condition improved after the surcharge was applied. However, 
due to the longer distances in the alternative routes, the traveler would expect a much longer 
travel time even when the surcharge rate is still high. Similarly, in the median congested 
route category, since many of these routes are also located in the center of the city, the 
alternative routes still face a considerable amount of surcharge and extra travel time. This 
is the opposite case in the un-congested category, since travelers expect a higher surcharge 




























































































































Table 2. 2 Path Analysis 












From 12 to 10 
 Links Time Surcharge 
Path 1 12-11-10 13.21 15.00 
Path 2 12-3-4-11-10 20.99 9.98 
Path 3 
12-3-4-5-9-













 From 10 to 18 
 Links Time Surcharge 
Path 1 10-16-18 7.83 17.27 
Path 2 10-17-16-18 16.58 15.21 










 From 5 to 3 
 Links Time Surcharge 
Path 1 5-4-3 6.19 0.65 
Path 2 5-6-2-1-3 19.3 14.05 
Path 3 
5-9-10-11-
12-3 28.22 21.46 
 









7,476,972 3,705,927 -50.44% 
Travel Demand 360,600 199,240 -44.75% 
Average link 
travel time 
8.81 7.87 -10.65% 
Average link 
V/C ratio 
1.09 0.75 -31.86% 
Average 
Surcharge rate 
0.00 3.09 N/A 
Average link 
travel cost 
8.81 11.25 27.74% 
 
Overall, as table 3.3 shows, with a 44.75% demand change, the total system travel 
time was reduced by 50.44% and each link travel time was reduced by 10.65%. The road 






increase in cost to accomplish their trip.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this research, we introduced an economical way to calculate the optimal E-
hailing surcharge rate in order to improve travel time reliability and system performance 
during peak travel hours. All link-based E-hailing service congestion surcharges were 
calculated through a heuristic approach. The results demonstrated that the principles of UE 
assignment were maintained in the travelers’ path choice behavior while leveraging the 
relationship between SO and UE using the marginal cost function.  At the same time, 
revenue received from this surcharge can be used in various ways, such as improving transit 
service quality or upgrading road infrastructure which could also advance road network 
performance.  In all applications in this paper, demand saw a significant drop from its 
original level.  Future work can explore alternate means of estimating demand response to 
surcharge levels and/or fine tune the existing function. 
 
2.6 APPENDIX 
Proposition 1. If the link performance functions are monotonic and nondecreasing in the 
convergence criterion met at the last iteration, the traffic assignment under the surcharge 
schema is the network system optimal solution.  
 



























𝑛−1| ≤              ( :→ 0) (23) 
 
This means we would have 𝑆𝑎
𝑛 ≅ 𝑆𝑎
𝑛−1 for each of the links at the last two iterations. Thus, 








































Which is equal to the first order condition of the system optimal solution objective 
function: 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ?̃?(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑎(𝑥𝑎) : 
 


























UE traffic assignment is the network system optimal solution, which is as expected given 
the previous work on the topic [12]. 
2.7 REFERENCES  
1. J. Petit and S. E. Shladover, “Potential cyberattacks on automated vehicles,” IEEE 
Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 546–556, Apr. 2015. 
2. Sherif, Ahmed BT, Khaled Rabieh, Mohamed MEA Mahmoud, and Xiaohui Liang. 
"Privacy-preserving ride sharing scheme for autonomous vehicles in big data 
era." IEEE Internet of Things Journal 4, no. 2 (2016): 611-618. 
3.  Phang, Sock-Yong, and Rex S. Toh. "Road congestion pricing in Singapore: 1975 to 
2003." Transportation Journal (2004): 16-25. 
4. Paul Johnson, Andrew Leicester & George Stoye (May 2012). "Fuel for Thought – The 
what, why and how of motoring taxation" . Institute for Fiscal Studies and Royal 
Automobile Club Foundation for Motoring. Retrieved 2012-05-21.  
5. Pigou, Arthur C. "The Economics of Welfare" (1920). 
6. Beckmann, Martin J. "On optimal tolls for highways, tunnels, and bridges.." In 
Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on the Theory of Traffic Flow. 1967. 
7. Dafermos, Stella C. "The traffic assignment problem for multiclass-user transportation 
networks." Transportation science 6, no. 1 (1972): 73-87. 
8. Yang, Hai, and Hai-Jun Huang. (2004) Modeling user adoption of advanced traveler 
information systems: A control theoretical approach for optimal endogenous growth. 
Transportation Research 12C, No.3-4, 193-207. 
9. Lévy-Lambert, H., 1968. Tarification des services à qualité variable: application aux 






10. Marchand, M., 1968. A note on optimal tolls in an imperfect environment. 
Econometrica 36 (3–4), 575–581. 
11. Wang, Q. and N.E. Lownes. All Links Based E-hailing Pricing and Surcharge 
Mechanism for Transportation system Performance Improvement. Proceedings of the 
98th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC., 
United State. Jan. 2019. 
12. Sheffi, Yosef. Urban transportation networks. Vol. 6. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, 1985. 
13. Varian, Hal R. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach: Ninth 
International Student Edition. WW Norton & Company, 2014. 
14. Wang Q, Fiondella L, Lownes N E, et al. Integrating equilibrium assignment in game-
theoretic approach to measure many-to-many transportation network vulnerability[C]. 
ieee international conference on technologies for homeland security, 2011: 351-357. 
15. Nikolic, G., Pringle, R., Jacob, C., Mendonca, N., Bekkers, M., Torday, A., & Rinelli, 
P. On-line dynamic pricing of HOT lanes based on corridor simulation of short-term 
future traffic conditions. In Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting.2015. 
16. Lu, Chung-Cheng, Hani S. Mahmassani, and Xuesong Zhou. "A bi-criterion dynamic 
user equilibrium traffic assignment model and solution algorithm for evaluating 
dynamic road pricing strategies." Transportation Research Part C: Emerging 
Technologies 16, no. 4 (2008): 371-389. 
17. Sharon, Guni, Michael W. Levin, Josiah P. Hanna, Tarun Rambha, Stephen D. Boyles, 
and Peter Stone. "Network-wide adaptive tolling for connected and automated 






18. Gupta, S., Vovsha, P., Dutta, A., Livshits, V., Zhang, W., & Zhu, H. (2018). 
Incorporation of travel time reliability in regional travel model. Transportation 
Research Record, 0361198118787090. 
19. Sharon, Guni, Michael W. Levin, Josiah P. Hanna, Tarun Rambha, Stephen D. Boyles, 
and Peter Stone. "Network-wide adaptive tolling for connected and automated 
vehicles." Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 84 (2017): 142-157. 
20. Transportation Networks for Research Core Team. Transportation Networks for 








*This paper is ready for submit 
CHAPTER 3: Tragedy of the Commons in Transportation 
 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
In transportation, the problem of the tragedy of the commons manifests itself in the 
form of road congestion: the social optimum and individual optimum are not consistent 
with each other. According to the first-best congestion pricing scheme, we propose a real-
time surcharge system to solve this problem. Using taxi data in New York City, we use the 
solution to optimize drivers’ path choices under the proposed surcharge system, finding 




Severe road congestion is a global crisis across all large and growing cities. 
According to the INRIX 2018 global traffic scorecard, an average American driver loses 
97 hours in one year due to congestion, costing $87 billion in lost time (INRIX, 2019). In 
addition to the significant time loss, congestion also incurs more energy use, more pollution, 
higher incidents of accidents and more mental frustration. Although governments have 
tried many strategies to mitigate congestion problems, they still face a real public policy 
challenge in improving the complicated transportation system, for example, designing a 







The underlying economic reason that causes road congestion is in essence a 
problem of the tragedy of the commons. Imagine an original point A and a destination B 
with 2000 identical cars demanding to go from point A to B. Two roads are available that 
can achieve this goal: one is wider and longer and takes 40 minutes, and the other one is 
shorter and takes x/80 minutes (x is the number of cars). Figure 3.1 illustrates the situation. 
We find that every driver wants to choose the shorter path since even all 2000 cars use the 
shorter path, it takes 25 minutes to go through, which is preferred than the longer 40 
minutes road. However, from the social point of view, 400 cars choosing the longer path 
and 1600 cars choosing the shorter path are the social optimum solution in terms of total 
time used. The social welfare can be improved if we can identify and solve such a problem.  
The ability to reach the social optimum hinges on the information availability. 
Without knowing the real-time demand and how much time it takes to go through road 
links, it is impossible for the social planner to know how to improve. Thanks to the 
explosion of mobile networking technology in the last decade, massive previously 
nonexistent transportation information is now available and make it possible for the first 
time in the history to run smart micro-management in the real-time. The mobile networking 
technology can track each driver’s location and path. If economic incentives or penalties 
are used, the technology can make it possible to implement a real-time responsive system. 
The social planner thus can take advantage of the information to truly optimize the 
transportation system and manage the congestion issue 
much more efficiently. 
In our paper, we explore the available information and obtain an analytical solution 






real-time charging approach to reach the social optimum. We find that the surcharge should 
be equal to the externality cost of adding a marginal vehicle to the road. Using New York 
taxi data combined with other smaller datasets, we use a so-called “least-iteration-cycle” 
method to optimize taxi drivers’ path choices under the proposed surcharge system. We 
find that the total travel time reduces by 7% to 19% in peak hours for three random days 
in 2010, indicating that the congestion problem can be alleviated significantly using the 
surcharge system.  
Congestion pricing, especially targeting the road congestion, is not new in public 
policies. Pigou (1912) was probably the first one to argue that road users should be charged 
with their marginal external costs. Knight (1924) also addressed this issue almost one 
hundred years ago. The congestion pricing of marginal external costs has since remained 
the leading principle in the transport economics and is referred as the first-best strategy on 
congestion regulation (Button and Verhoef, eds, 1998). However, the first-best pricing 
scheme is not practical with enough information, so the second-best schemes was largely 
discussed in the literature (Verhoef et al., 1996; Verhoef, 2005). In our paper, with the 
current technology, we are able to compute the first-best strategy for the first time in 
practice. 
In regards with the public policies, Singapore began implementing congestion 
pricing in 1975. The government established a restricted driving area during peak traffic 
hours from 7:30am to 9:30 am and levied extra toll charges. With this restriction, peak-
hour traffic in the restricted zone dropped by 45% (Phang and Toh, 2004). After the traffic 
estimation and prediction tool (TrEPS) was implemented in 2010, the traffic volume in the 






similar congestion pricing system was adopted in London, UK in 2003, utilizing automatic 
number plate recognition Monday through Friday from 7:00 am to 6:00 pm. The record 
shows the ridership of public transit in the city increased by 50%-60% and the number of 
automobiles entering the central area decreased by 21%. The environmental pollution also 
improved, and the number of accidents were reduced (Topham, 2015), the collected 
revenue can be used to increase public goods. Today, Australia, Singapore, Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Malta, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, 
Brazil and Chile all have some version of a congestion road pricing scheme and results 
shows the peak hour travel demand is consistently reduced along with other social and 
environmental negative externalities like air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, visual 
intrusion, noise and road accidents (Jackson et.al, 2012). However, all these methods are 
effective mainly through demand reduction, they cannot solve the tragedy of commons 
problem we point out in the simple model (Figure 3.1). 
 
3.3 THE MODEL 
3.3.1 The social planner’s optimization problem 
Assume that all vehicles are identical (with no size difference). The road system is 
composed of N number of links with 𝑖 indicating the 𝑖𝑡ℎ link. The traffic flow (how many 
cars go through) in a certain amount of time is indicated by 𝑥. (We use traffic flow and 







Assume drivers can have different origins and destinations (ODs) and information 
about all ODs are known to the social planner. The objective of the social planner is to 
minimize the total amount of travel time: 
      Min
𝑥𝑖
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑇(𝑥𝑖)𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2…𝑁                                                   (1) 
Subject to: ODs are fixed 
Note that the social planner faces the constraint that the ODs are fixed. In other 
words, we do not allow OD demand to respond to public policies in this model. We will 
discuss this assumption at greater length later. 
 
3.3.2 The social cost 
We propose to use a real time charging system to optimize the social planner’s 
problem. The charging system will make sure all social costs are internalized. Let’s first 
analyze the extent of the social costs.  Let’s first analyze how much are the social costs. 
 
Given the social planner’s objective function in Equation 1, if there is one 




                                                            (2) 
 
However, we note that when the marginal driver tries to make a path decision, 
his/her private cost is simply 𝑇(𝑥𝑖). He/she will use a map application in his/her mobile 
device to make the choice based on the estimated travel time for different paths. The 
amount of travel time given the current situation is the only information he/she will take 






the system, the added vehicle will increase the traffic flow and then change the travel time 




, which is the externality effect/social cost. 
 
To internalize the social cost, we apply a charging system such that when the 
marginal driver enters the link, he/she needs to pay 𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑥𝑖





                                                            (3) 
If 𝑥𝑖 is a close to zero number, meaning there is little traffic flow, the charge is close 
to zero. If the marginal effect on the travel time, 
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑥𝑖
, is zero, meaning the marginal vehicle 
has a zero externality effect, the charge is equal to zero. 
 
3.3.3 The optimization strategy and computation method 
For the optimization problem, we cannot find an analytical solution since the traffic 
flow 𝑥 is subject to the OD constraint. Instead, we will use an iterated computation method.  
For the OD pair for a marginal driver, there can be many different paths to go from 
origin to destination. We use 𝑗 to indicate the 𝑗𝑡ℎ path. The driver’s objective is to choose 
one path to minimize his/her travel time: 
min
𝑗
∑ 𝐼𝑗𝑖𝑇(𝑥𝑖)𝑖                                                        (4) 
In this equation, 𝐼𝑗𝑖 is an indicator, which is equal to 1 if the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ is included in the 








∑ 𝐼𝑗𝑖 [𝑇(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑥𝑖
]𝑖                                                        (5) 
If all individual drivers choose his/her optimal paths after taking social cost into 
consideration, the social optimum will be reached. The intuition of our computation 
method is to adjust all drivers’ paths one by one and make enough iterations to eventually 
reach the social optimum. 
 
The general steps of optimization computation are described below. (A more 
specific model will be presented in the implications section.): 
 
Step 1: Start with the first new coming driver. Calculate the surcharge according to 
Equation 3; Given all other drivers’ paths, adjust to an optimal one according to Equation 
5. In this Step, we need to find all the possible paths to go from origin to destination and 
then choose the optimal paths; 
Step 2: Move to the next driver. Given all other drivers’ paths including the adjusted 
one, repeat Step 1. When all drivers have adjusted their path, one iteration is completed; 
Step 3: Update the link travel time based on the new traffic assignment; Calculate 
the total travel time using Equation 1; 
Step 4: Return to the first driver, update the surcharge using a “least-iteration-cycle” 
method; 
Step 5: Repeat the process until the system is steady (the surcharge difference 







Note that for the large urban road network, to identify all the possible routes from 
origin to destination is impossible. We will use a “least- iteration-cycle” method to reduce 
the computation burden. More detail will be explained latter.  
 
3.3.4 Specification on function forms 
To implement the model on the empirical data, we need to specify the function form 
of the travel time t(x). In the transportation literature, the relationship between travel time 
and traffic flow is less direct. The common functions used are relationship between average 
speed, traffic flow and traffic density. The travel time is calculated by dividing the lane 
length by speed. 
The empirical evidence in the transportation literature (citations?) shows that the 
speed is a linear function of density. The speed is denoted by u, and the density is by k. So: 
𝑢 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑘                                                       (6) 
 




                                                       (7) 
Combing these two equations, we can write the function between speed and 











FIGURE 3. 1 Function Forms 
 
Note that speed, 𝑢, and traffic flow 𝑥 has a nonlinear relationship. When the 
traffic flow is very small, or there is no traffic, the traffic speed is very high. Or, traffic is 
congested and the traffic speed is very low. The traffic flow is also a nonlinear function 
of density. When the traffic flow is low, or there is no traffic, this results in a high speed 
and low density. Or, traffic congestion is high, which results in a low speed and high 
density. 
 
If we increase one link by one marginal car, the expectation is that the speed will 
be lower. According to Equation 6, the density will be higher. In other words, increased 
demand in the road results in increasing density. If there is no congestion in the road, the 
transportation demand is equal to observed traffic flow. But when there is congestion, the 







FIGURE 3. 2 Traffic flow and demand 
   
For simplicity, we assume that the potential demand is symmetric to the traffic flow 
after the road’s maximum flow is reached and start to congest. If there is one marginal car 
entering a link, the potential demand is increased by one car, but the traffic flow could 
increase or decrease. This can be shown in Figure 3.2. If we mark the corresponding 𝐷 
when x reaches its maximum as 𝐷∗, the relationship between 𝐷 and 𝑥 can be written as: 
 
𝑥 = {
𝐷,       𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷∗
2𝐷∗ − 𝐷,   𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 𝐷∗
                                                       (8) 
 
Given the relationship between traffic flow, density, speed and demand, we can 
finally write down the function for travel time. Use 𝑙 to indicate one link’s length, the 









                                                                       (9) 










,     𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷∗
𝑙
(2𝐷∗−𝐷)/𝑘
,    𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 𝐷∗
                                         (10) 












,    𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 𝐷∗
                                        (10) 
In the empirical pat, we will estimate 𝛼0 and 𝛼1 in Equation 6 and then calculate 
the surcharge with concrete parameters, which is shown in Appendix. 
 
3.4 THE DATA 
We used three datasets in this project. The first one is New York City speed and 
volume data, the second one is New York City taxi data include each taxi’s pickup and 
drop-off locations, the third one is the New York City road network structure data and the 
fourth one is New York City hourly link travel time. In the following section, we will 
describe the datasets one by one in more details. 
 
The New York City speed and volume data are collected by multiple stations 
managed by the Department of Transportation of New York State. We use the speed data 
in Region 11 for years 2014 to 2016. We also match the data geographically with the New 
York City taxi data and use only the stations that are located in the taxi data. The speed and 






The first speed range is 0 to 20 miles per hour, the second range is 20 to 25 miles per hour, 
and so on and so forth. The highest range is above 85 miles per hour. Since region 11 is 
the urban area, cars concentrate around the lower speed range. Figure 3.3 shows the 
distribution of average speed (weighted by traffic volume). The mean is equal to 22.08 
miles per hour. We use the speed and volume data to estimate the linear relationship 
between speed and density (Equation 6). 
 
The New York taxi trip data is collected by the New York City Taxi & Limousine 
Commission (TLC), which data include pick-up and drop-off coordinates, fare, payment 
method, passenger numbers, etc. Before Green taxis joined the operation in August 2013, 
in New York City the Yellow taxis provided around 485,000 trips per day with an average 
distance of 2.6 miles per trip.  There are roughly 13,500 Yellow taxies with 30,000 active 
taxi drivers. Pick-up and drop-off have similar patterns by time of day and day of week. 
During the weekdays, two trip peaks occur at rush hours, which are around 8am and 5pm. 
Therefore, we chose 8:00-9:00am and 5:00-6:00pm for our model test run. 
 
The New York city road network structure data provided by OpenStreetMap (OSM), 
which is the main data source for the road network structure include: link nodes’ GPS 
coordination, direction, length, road type categories etc. The New York taxi trip data was 
mapped into this data layer by GPS coordination. 
Though we have plenty of speed and volume data collection stations, they do not 
cover every link in the whole road network. Therefore, we use the results of the estimated 






algorithm similar to Paolo et, al 2014) The estimation was conducted by Dan Work 
research group (DWG). Due to data record/storage errors, the errors accounted for in this 
estimation are roughly 7.5%. The following Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the 
data used in the New York City model implementation. During the peak hours the trip 
length average from 2.21 to 2.62 mile and trip duration time average will be around 12 
minutes (648.5 ~772.05 second).  





3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To estimate Equation 5, we run a linear regression with fixed effects of monitoring 







FIGURE 3. 3 Distribution of average speed 
 
Table 3. 2 Speed and density          
 
 
We then run iterations to find optimal real-time surcharge to achieve total minimum 
travel time for the whole taxi system. In this process, a heuristic approach, the “least-
iteration-cycle” method is proposed to find all possible paths to go from a given origin to 
destination (ODs). With the initial setting of each vehicle's OD on step 1, we first identify 
the least costly path for each taxi. Then, we estimate the traffic flow and travel time using 
the previous shortest path assignment at step 2. Next, the link marginal cost function is 
applied to estimate the externality for the other vehicles on that link if additional vehicles 






Average method (MSA) is then applied to step 4. Each previous iteration is given more 
weight than subsequent iterations. Finally this process returns to the first step and repeats 
until the convergence criteria meet. Overall, the “least-iteration-cycle” method searches 
drivers' least cost routes in each iteration, and each link's surcharge cost indirectly induces 
their routes choices to internalize the externality effect on all other drivers. The following 
describes the iteration details: 
 
Ste1-Step3: Same as in Section: The optimization strategy and computation method; 




𝑆𝑎𝑡 + (1 −
1
𝑚
) ∗ 𝑆𝑎(𝑡−1)                                                   (12) 
in which 𝑚 is the iteration number and 𝑎 indicates average. 




𝑖 ≤ 1%                                                   (13) 
 
We apply this model to New York City using 2010 taxi trip data and transportation 
network information data. we randomly pick three weekdays (January 5th, February 2nd  
and October 5th , 2010) to calculate the total saving time. We focus only on the most 
congested time periods 8:00am-9:00am (AM peak) and 5:00pm-6:00pm (PM peak). The 
results are presented in Table 3.3. When calculating the surcharge, we use $20/h as the 
value of time. 
As Table 3 shows, the surcharge per link is averaged from $0.22 to $0.92, and the 
total system travel time improves by 7 ~ 19\% depending the date and peak time.  The 






increases from 1\% to 27\%. From the information of average link time and average speed, 
we can see that the amount of total saving time does not depend on the congestion level, 
but the traffic distribution during that time period. For example, Jan. 5th 2010 and Feb. 2nd 
2010 have similar congestion levels (average link travel time around 163sec and average 
link speed around 1.35mph), one network (Jan. 5th, 2010 5pm) could only improve 7\% of 
total travel time but the other network (Feb. 2nd, 2010 8am) could save 17%. 





After the surcharge, the congestion is significantly reduced. Figure 3.4 displays the 
comparison of link speed before and after the surcharge for October 5th 2010. In the map, 
the network traffic speed diagram is divided into three categories: the red color represents 
the link speed below 10mph, the yellow color represents the speed between 10mph-25mph, 








FIGURE 3. 4 New York City peak hour speed diagram 
 
(Upper Left: Estimate of 8:00am-9:00am traffic with no surcharge. Upper Right: Estimate 
of 8:00am-9:00am traffic with surcharge. Lower Left: Estimate of 5:00pm – 6:00pm traffic 







 As the speed diagrams show, the traffic condition improves after the surcharge is 
applied. The upper left and lower left panels show the link average speed without surcharge 
for 8:00am-9:00am and 5:00pm-6:00pm respectively. The upper right and lower right 
panels compare the speed map after the surcharge correspondently. It shows that after the 
surcharge is applied, the red color reduces and the yellow color increases, especially in the 
downtown corridors and major avenues. In the downtown of New York City, the avenues, 
which generally run perpendicular from North to South, are often one or two lanes wider 
than the streets, which run horizontally from east to west. The diagrams show that after the 
surcharge, vertical congestion is reduced on “avenues” more than horizontal “Streets”. Due 
to faster speed and wider roads, when there is no surcharge, too many vehicles tend to 
cluster at “avenues” and cause the congestion there. After the surcharge is applied, due to 
the higher price at congested “avenues”, some traffic flow will switch to alternative routes, 
therefore reducing the congestion. 
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show the taxi volume changes in more details after the 
surcharge is applied. In the diagram, the red line represents the taxi volume reduction after 
the surcharge has been applied, and the blue line represents the increase volume. The width 





























 As Figure 3.6 displays, traffic volume on area 1 and area 2 has a significant volume 
drop during the 8am peak hour of October 5th, 2010.  For example, the FDR Drive helps 
reduce the congestion in the lower Manhattan area. Since the FDR Drive is a 3 lanes 
highway, it doesn’t get congested with additional volume of 265 taxis switched to this route 
from other routes. However, as the Figure 5 shows, these two areas still have a significant 












During the 5pm peak hour, the volume changes in areas 1 and 2 are different from 
what they are at 8am on the same day. Due to the heavy congestion in area 4, some traffic 
shifts to alternative routes in areas1 and 2 to reduce the congestion. Traffic also shifts to 
alternative routes on the Queens Midtown Tunnel and Ed Koch Queensboro Bridges. 
Therefore, the volume on these routes increases as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 display more details of the surcharge rate with the width 
of the lines representing the numerical value of the surcharge rate. The top panel of Figure 
3.7 shows the surcharges at 8am on October 5th 2010 for the road direction of West to East 
or North to South, while the bottom panel for East to West or South to North. It shows that 
the highest surcharges are located at East to West bound bridges/tunnels which connect the 
traffic from Brooklyn to Manhattan for the morning peak hour. Meanwhile, due to the large 
traffic demand and less alternative routes to the John F. Kennedy International (JFK) 
Airport, the surcharges to the connection roads from both direction are also high. 
Figure 3.8 shows the surcharges at 5pm on October 5th 2010. It shows that due to 
the traffic pattern from work to home, the highest surcharges are located at both East to 










FIGURE 3. 7 Surcharge rate diagram at 8am 
 
 
Top: West to East or North to South surcharge rate at 8am. Bottom: East to West or South to North 






FIGURE 3. 8 Surcharge rate diagram at 5pm 
 
 
Top: West to East or North to South surcharge rate at 5pm. Bottom: East to West or South to North 






3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper, we obtain an analytical solution to solve problem of the tragedy of 
the commons in road congestion. Based on the analytical solution, we propose a real-time 
surcharge system to achieve the social optimum. Under the surcharge system, drivers will 
get penalties to take the more congested route and has an incentive to choose a less 
congested route. Then the path choices for all the drivers are optimized for the whole 
transportation network. Due to the complexity of the transportation network, 
mathematically calculating the optimal surcharge for the entire network system is 
infeasible. So we use the “least-iteration-cycle” approach to lower this computation burden. 
By iteratively repeating simulations of drivers’ route choice, we are able to reach an 
optimal real-time surcharge framework that significantly reduces congestion. We apply the 
model to New York City taxi data and find that the surcharge system can reduce the total 
travel time by 7% to 19% in peak hours for three random days in 2010. 
Please note that since we only have the detailed information of taxi vehicles, the 
optimization is only partial. We anticipate that if we have all vehicles’ data, the system will 
have even higher improvement. As autonomous vehicles are the future way of 
transportation and many companies are racing to develop such technologies, we can be 
certain that more transportation information will be available and we can implement the 
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The empirical evidence shows that: 




 , 𝑘 is a function of 𝑥 as following: 
𝑘 = {
57.25 − √3277.56 − 4.17𝑥, 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 ≤ 57.25;
57.25 + √3277.56 − 4.17𝑥, 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 > 57.25;
 
Here 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 786. Although traffic flow cannot surpass 786, the potential 
demand can. According to Figure 3.2, 𝑘 is an increasing function of demand 𝐷. When 
𝑘 ≤ 57.25, 
𝑘 = 57.25 − √3277.56 − 4.17𝐷, 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝐷 ≤ 786 
When 𝑘 > 57.25, demand will surpass 786. For simplicity, we assume the 
potential demand is symmetric to the traffic flow curve according to the line 𝑥 = 786. So 
when 𝑘 > 57.25, 𝐷 = 1572 − 𝑥, and: 
𝑘 = 57.25 + √−3277.56 + 4.17𝐷, 𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 786 
Combine these two equations, the full function can be written as: 
𝑘 = {
57.25 − √3277.56 − 4.17𝐷, 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝐷 ≤ 786
57.25 + √−3277.56 + 4.17𝐷,              𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 786
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𝑙(57.25 + √−3277.56 + 4.17𝐷)
1572 − 𝐷
,               𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 786
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,             𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 786
 
 
 
 
